Supply chain disruptions have historically accelerated infrastructure investment and regional economic integration that might otherwise have taken decades to materialise. The reduction in maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz as a result of the Iran conflict proved no exception. Roughly 20% of global oil trade passes through the Strait each day, alongside a significant share of non-oil commodities, including around 30% of the world’s maritime fertiliser supply. With maritime traffic now severely curtailed, attention is shifting to overland alternatives and the role that Syria and Jordan could play in providing them.

Alternatives

The case for diversifying Gulf supply chains beyond exclusive reliance on maritime routes has been building for some time. The six GCC countries source the majority of their food from abroad – Qatar, in particular, depends on food imports for some 90% of its domestic demand by some estimates, making resilient overland routes more strategically important than ever. With most imports traditionally funnelled through a single maritime chokepoint, the incentive to develop land-based routes is considerable. Alternative ports outside the Strait, including Jeddah and Yanbu on Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast, and Fujairah and Sohar in the UAE and Oman, offer a foundation. However, the development of resilient overland corridors through the Levant represents the most promising long-term opportunity.

Integrated Networks

Concrete steps to realise that opportunity were under way as of mid-2026. In March of that year senior Customs and trade officials from Syria and Jordan met on the sidelines of a highlevel Jordanian government visit to Damascus. Both sides agreed to facilitate the movement of Syrian trucks to the Port of Aqaba for loading and unloading operations, and the passage of Jordanian trucks to Syrian ports for the same purpose. The agreement reflects broader strategic ambition. Both governments are seeking to leverage their geographic positions and deepen coordination to position Syria and Jordan as regional hubs for assembling and re-exporting goods to Gulf and European markets.

Rail Corridor

Beyond road transport, a more ambitious infrastructure proposal has gained traction in regional policy discussions. The proposal envisions a high-speed railway linking northern Saudi Arabia to Syria through Jordan. The line would begin in the Saudi city of Arar and extend towards major Syrian cities at speeds exceeding 200 km per hour and is designed to move fresh produce and commercial goods efficiently and create a new overland regional supply network.

Syria’s agricultural profile makes it well suited to this role. A combination of varied growing conditions, productive farmland and proximity to Gulf consumer markets means Syria could serve as a primary food sourcing base for the region. With a high-speed rail connection in place, domestically grown produce could reach Gulf cities within hours. The economic multiplier effects of such a corridor are significant. Associated downstream activity would include contract farming zones dedicated to export, sorting and packaging centres, cold storage facilities, quality control laboratories and modern railway loading platforms, generating employment and investment well beyond the transport sector.

Connectivity Drive

The corridor sits within a framework of emerging regional economic integration. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, announced at the 2023 G20 Summit and involving the EU, France, Germany, Italy, Saudi Arabia and the US aims to connect India to Europe via the Gulf and the Middle East. The Syrian-Saudi Arabia corridor could function as a branch of this project, with trade routes running from India through the Gulf, along the Saudi-Syrian railway, to Syria’s ports of Latakia and Tartus, and onward to Europe. In this configuration, Syria would recover elements of its historical position as a commercial bridge between Asia and Europe.