The push among GCC states to invest in Africa came about in earnest following the 2007-08 global food price crisis, and targeted agricultural land and strategic commodity production. Agribusiness, sovereign wealth funds and other agri-investment vehicles were the main players. Primarily state-led, the investments at that time centred on framework agreements with the host market, guaranteeing purchases and providing subsidised credit.
Fast forward and in October 2014 the Dubai Chamber of Commerce noted that Gulf entities had contributed over $30bn to African infrastructure development over the previous 10 years, a substantial figure when one considers the GCC’s relatively recent start of outreach to the continent and its origins in agriculture-focused investments. The trend positions the GCC well for capitalising on that growth, while simultaneously providing direct positive implications for food security. Arguably of more importance is the maturation of investment strategy towards the region from that early focus to more complex investments across a range of burgeoning sectors including infrastructure, construction, telecoms, and banking and finance.
With a less-than-hospitable environment for crop production and vulnerability to geopolitical forces affecting the region’s food supply, food security strategies among GCC states have historically concentrated on price controls, consumer subsidies, strategic stockholding and trade diversification. GCC states also face an expanding population, with growth of around 40% expected by 2030 over 2010 figures. This has already led to pressure on food supplies, while prices are increasingly exposed to geopolitical factors and the impacts of climate change. GCC states import as much as 90% of their food.
The traditional method of averting the local impact of food price volatility and supply disruption has typically been through subsidies and wage hikes, but this is unsustainable over the long term in light of concerns over inflation and the rising cost of the welfare state. GCC governments have recognised the critical need to establish consistent supplies of staple foods such as rice and grains, with early strategies focusing on self-sufficiency. As such, Qatar at one point sought to produce a full 70% of its food domestically by 2023. This was to be achieved through the use of desalination and hydroponics. However, this approach was soon found to be inadequate for safeguarding food supplies and keeping prices stable and affordable.
Saudi Arabia’s wheat programme began in the 1970s, but the Kingdom found its aquifers being depleted as a result. As the world’s greatest importer of barley, rising meat and dairy production has also meant a growing need to import greater amounts of strategic commodities, including corn and barley, to use as animal feed – a full two-thirds of world barley exports are used by Saudi Arabia to feed its sheep. By 2008 the kingdom had declared it would gradually end production of wheat and instead concentrate on building up reliable sources abroad.
GCC states will remain dependent at least through the medium term on energy exports for importing and financing food supplies. A decline in the price of petroleum products will therefore undermine their ability to sustain this offset on costs to domestic consumers, weakening their ability to pay for the welfare model.
Qatar imports about 90% of its food needs, with this expected to increase 153% over the next decade as the population grows, making the country vulnerable to prices fluctuations. The state, like most other GCC nations, has invested in land acquisition in Africa in order to meet demand, notably Sudan and Kenya, among several other locations.
Along with sourcing from Eastern Europe and farther afield in South America and Asia, GCC investors began looking more to Africa – East Africa in particular – where available farmland was seen as a way to provide domestic populations with reliable sources of key agriculture products. Countries targeted in the first phase included Sudan, Ethiopia, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique and Tanzania, along with the North African countries of Morocco and Egypt.
Many African investment destinations themselves, however, suffer from profound food insecurity and political risks. Indeed, the Horn and Sahel regions of the continent are the most famine-prone places on the planet. This has presented foreign investors with a steep learning curve when it comes to navigating African markets and relying on those destinations for strategic commodities. Local concerns over land rights and food security presented serious operational and reputational risks for Gulf investors. Early risks relating to land use were due in large part to the absence of adequate land ownership regulation, with Oxfam reporting that up to 90% of land in sub-Saharan Africa was unregistered, placing local residents at greater risk of being displaced for new projects.
Many African governments have shifted their emphasis to boosting local benefit, a trend that is likely to reach beyond agriculture in the coming years. This presents new challenges for investors; however, it can present longer-term benefits and opportunities as well. In a model for how this can be achieved, the UAE’s Al Dahra Holding enforces a 50-50 sharing formula, according to Khadim Al Darei, its vice-chairman, in a statement given to local media in early 2014. According to Al Darei, Al Dahra has avoided some of the problems encountered by other foreign investors by actively creating jobs for locals and sharing its produce.
The current phase of GCC investment in Africa appears set to address many of the earlier structural weaknesses and, in the process, help develop a more viable long-term investment environment in many parts of the continent. This includes shifts on the foreign investor side, and also locally among African governments and key stakeholders. Countries like Zambia and Kenya are devising terms for land use that could help stabilise conditions on the ground. Leases in Zambia are likely to be provided for no more than 25 years, and will come with a requirement that crops produced on the land be split up to 50-50 between exports and the local market. Likewise in Kenya, there will likely be land leases as opposed to outright sales.
Africa’s appetite for foreign direct investment (FDI) remains strong. FDI is more widely recognised in Africa as a way to help provide employment opportunities and develop “expertise technologies and capital for improving infrastructure such as roads, education and health facilities”, as noted by the Centre for International Governance Innovation. Local stakeholders in Kenya have shown themselves to be “willing to accept and participate in land leases, provided they include certain provisions”, such as 15-year maximums, and that they be “renewable subject to mutual negotiation”. This involvement would contrast with the historical trend in which landowners were typically excluded from negotiations.
Helping to ensure a greater degree of trust among local communities will provide for more sustainable investments in agriculture, and will have positive knock-on effects for other sectors as well. In Kenya, for example, public-private partnerships (PPPs) received a boost in 2013 with the PPP Act coming into force, “in order to strengthen the legal and regulatory framework for PPPs… [and] remove duplication and overlap”.
Incentives being promoted to lure back investors after an at-times rocky start include the Kenya Investment Authority signing a double tax agreement (DTA) with Qatar in April 2014. The deal will protect investors from tax on repatriated profits after they have already paid in their country of investment. A “reciprocal agreement” was also signed that is meant to “guarantee Kenyan and Qatari businesspeople of rights to their assets in the two countries”. Kenya that month also had a draft DTA with Iran and the UAE, and a memorandum of understanding was signed between KenGen and Nebras Power Company of Qatar.
In early 2014 African representatives presented land lease and production sharing deals to GCC investors as a means to aid small-scale farmers and to also ensure food supplies for locals. Ghana, for its part, has offered tax-free agreements for investment in agriculture in the country’s north, with the premise of sharing part of the produced crops with the domestic market. But much is still to be done in terms of regulation. Kenya, for instance, still lacks a regulatory framework for foreign land deals, and specific guidelines on managing the leasing of foreign land are absent from policies.
According to the Dubai Chamber of Commerce, Africa’s infrastructure needs will require investment of $2.6trn by 2030. Hamad Buamim, the chamber’s president, has pointed out that it is not only larger firms that are set to seize opportunities in Africa, but small companies too. During the October 2014 Africa Global Business Forum held in Dubai, Buamim noted that “given the perceived risks associated with mega-projects in several African markets, smaller-scale projects have become increasingly more appealing, especially in the energy industry.”
GCC investors, he added, are especially well positioned for smaller-scale projects in Africa. Underscoring the government’s confidence in the African market, the chamber had plans to open offices in Ghana, Mozambique, South Africa, Kenya, Uganda and Angola. On similar lines, non-oil trade between the emirates and Africa jumped 141% from 2009 to 2013. The top non-oil partners that year were Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Ghana, Mali, Tanzania, Nigeria, Kenya, Algeria, the DRC, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Senegal and Morocco.
Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund is also expanding its reach in Africa, including through “impact investments” with social and environmental benefits. While Qatar Holding’s $400,000 investment in 2013 to support the agricultural supply chain in East Africa was a modest start, the potential for the fund to bring substantial impact should not be discounted. This may especially be the case through its support for private sector investments. With backing from the fund, Qatar National Bank bought a 12.5% stake in Togo’s Ecobank Transnational in September 2014. The bank is already present in Libya, Mauritania, South Sudan, Sudan and Tunisia, and through its Egyptian business Société Général.
Africa’s potential for GCC telecoms is also showing signs of growth, though there have been some setbacks as well. The UAE’s Etisalat was in late 2013 the biggest player from the Gulf in Africa’s telecoms sector, taking a controlling stake in Gabon Telecom, and later that year a $5.3bn stake in Maroc Telecom. This was despite Etisalat experiencing an underwhelming year in Africa in 2013, with a year-on-year contraction of 1% by June of that year (excluding Nigeria) and a 9% contraction in Egypt alone. Smaller UAE companies at that time were pulling back their stakes: Warid Group sold off its Uganda operations, and Emirates International Telecommunications, a subsidiary of Dubai Holding, decided to offload its 35% stake in Tunisie Telecom. Saudi Telecom Company maintains its 75% stake in Cell C of South Africa. In 2010 Zain sold most of its sub-Saharan operations to Bharti Airtel for approximately $9bn. In late 2013 Zain was looking to concentrate on North Africa rather than sub-Saharan Africa, seeking a controlling stake in Inwi in Morocco, where it had a 15% stake. Qatar’s Ooredoo also operates in Tunisia and Algeria.
For Gulf investors, the unique support for the private sector from state backers is likely to be a key factor in helping investors weather further storms. Saad Khalil, the director-general of the King Abdullah Initiative for Saudi Agricultural Investment Abroad, told the World Food Security Summit in Dubai in February 2014 that the solution must now come from partnerships between the private and public sectors, with the government encouraging risk-taking through the provision of interest-free loans and partnerships with the Saudi Agricultural and Livestock Investment Company.
Many of the core challenges experienced in the Gulf’s earlier experiment with African agriculture and land investment will no doubt be encountered in other sectors in the future. At the top of the list of risks facing Gulf investors in Africa remain operational risks, the honouring of contracts, a lack of skilled labour and technology, currency volatility, political risk and the change of government policies, in particular in the midst of longer-term projects.
Thinking Long Term
Encouragingly, foreign investors and African governments alike appear to have taken heed of lessons learned. They are demonstrating increasing commitment to bolster structural mechanisms that should bring improvement to the investment environment. This applies to agriculture, but also sectors such as energy and infrastructure. Moreover, a shift towards the inclusion of landowners and local stakeholders – as well as ensuring greater and more tangible benefits for the local communities – presents the opportunity for developing a more viable and sustainable destination for the GCC’s strategic long-term investments on the African continent.