In March 2010 Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, South Africa’s minister of international relations and cooperation, announced that her department was working on a new strategy framework for the country’s foreign policy. This in itself was not novel; the Department of Foreign Affairs – renamed the Department of International Relations and Cooperation in 2007 – has published a series of such documents since the mid-1990s, usually outlining strategic plans in three-year tranches. However, while the traditional policy documents relied on the input of successive ministers, heads of the nation’s diplomatic missions and senior government officials, the most recent iteration of South Africa’s published foreign policy was formulated using a more inclusive process.
POLICY PROCESS: In its making, figures from the business, academic and labour arenas were consulted, as well members of broader civil society. Having been approved by the cabinet, the new white paper was put before parliament for its endorsement, and in August 2011 it was finally made available to the public. The reaction to the white paper’s publication, however, has been mixed. Some commentators noted that beyond the aspiration contained in the title (“Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu”) lay little more than a reworking of well-established foreign policy objectives, such as South-South relations, North-South relations, the importance of links within the African continent, and the pursuit of effective multilateralism at the global level.
The document does, however, contain some new initiatives. One of them is the South African Development Partnership Initiative, heralded in position papers for some time but now embraced as official policy. Its creation represents an attempt to more effectively deploy the country’s foreign aid budget which it directs mainly towards the rest of the continent. Under the present arrangement, individual ministries respond to requests from their counterparts in foreign governments, but under the new proposal development assistance will be channelled through a single agency, providing much-needed oversight of this important facet of foreign policy.
CONTINENTAL HEAVYWEIGHT: In spite of the criticisms over the absence of a new strategy, the white paper’s creation of a more streamlined bureaucracy for handling diplomatic relations will certainly go some way in helping South Africa maintain its prominent role in continental affairs.
In a region where international political dynamics shift frequently and sometimes without warning, maintaining a role as a diplomatic heavyweight is a challenging job. South Africa, by dint of its high level of economic heft and sizeable moral clout, has long pursued an activist agenda and since the end of apartheid has firmly established itself as one of the chief actors in African politics.
A GLOBAL ROLE: The country accounts for roughly one-third of sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP, serves as the only African member of the G20 and has held the rotating presidency of the UN Security Council. As a result, South Africa has a vocal presence in a variety of forums, such as the South African Development Community and the Movement of Non-Aligned Nations, but perhaps its presence is most keenly felt in the African Union (AU).
South Africa joined the AU’s predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), some 30 years after it was founded. However, in the years after it joined in 1994, the country became a visible participant, and it was then-President Thabo Mbeki who oversaw the OAU’s dissolution and subsequent replacement by the AU in 2002, as the new organisation held its first assembly in Durban.
Of course, in an organisation that boasts 54 sometimes-fractious members, South Africa has occasionally struggled to assert its influence. In January 2012 the country broke with AU tradition to nominate its home affairs minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, as a candidate to become chairperson of the AU Commission, a post held by the former Gabonese foreign minister, Jean Ping.
Dlamini-Zuma, who was South Africa’s foreign minister for several years before assuming the position of home affairs minister – where she received accolades for eradicating the ministry’s reputation for mismanagement and corruption – has an impressive reputation as a diplomat, but her selection went against an unspoken agreement that the post would go to a smaller African country, to offset the dominance of the continent’s heavyweights, including South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt.
While Dlamini-Zuma’s nomination attracted the support of member states in southern and eastern Africa, states from Central, North and West Africa plumped for Ping, leading to a electoral deadlock. The contest will resume at the next annual AU summit to be held in Malawi in June 2012.
TRICKY BALANCE: Nevertheless, South Africa’s desire to maintain an even-handed approach, particularly in regards to African diplomacy, has often complicated its attempts to maintain its influential continental role. Where South Africa has on occasion called for domestic reform or change in other AU member states, such as in calling for the resignation of Hosni Mubarak during the Egyptian revolution, the policy is far from a consistent one.
During the violent aftermath of Côte d’Ivoire’s disputed elections of November 2010, South Africa refused to acknowledge the internationally recognised victory of Alassane Ouattara, and only belatedly joined the chorus of nations demanding that Laurent Gbagbo stand down. Similarly, during the revolution in Libya, South Africa first voted for the UN Security Council resolution allowing for a no-fly zone, but later reversed stance to protest air strikes on Libyan ground targets. The country has struggled in the past with effectively engaging neighbouring Zimbabwe, which has experienced a great deal of political turmoil over the course of the past decade.
South Africa’s desire to strike its own independent course in diplomacy – and avoid unnecessarily dogmatic approaches to international relations – at times appears to counter its domestic policy priorities, such as at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in October 2011, where it helped to block the adoption of a recommendation for a dedicated commissioner for democracy, a post intended to strengthen member nations’ compliance with human rights and democracy values.
KEEPING THE PEACE: South Africa has also played a major role in mitigating conflict on the continent. It chairs the AU post-conflict reconstruction and development committee on Sudan and has contributed significantly to peace-building efforts in the country since the peace accord signed in 2005. Following the establishment of South Sudan as an independent state in July 2011, President Jacob Zuma emphasised his country’s commitment to ensuring stability in the new state. As violence between Sudan and South Sudan continues, South Africa will undoubtedly maintain its role in the peace process.
South Africa recently expanded its humanitarian efforts by establishing formal relations with Somalia in March 2012. It is hoped that an exchange of diplomats will help the transitional Somali government in its peace negotiations.
BECOMING PART OF BRIC(S): South-South ties have become an increasing focus for the government, particularly in light of South Africa’s relationship with China, the country’s single biggest trading partner, rising to new prominence as a result of South Africa’s 2011 entry into the BRIC bloc, subsequently re-named BRICS. Speaking before the BRICS summit in April 2012, Nkoana-Mashabane pointed out that the group was still in its formative stages, and that South Africa was now in a position to “make an invaluable contribution in envisioning the future of BRICS”. The country’s membership is consistent with a long-term support of increased multilateralism and against traditional concentrations of power.
It is still unclear what effect South Africa’s membership of BRICS will have on its foreign policy. Widely differing forms of government, disparate political values and China’s campaign to deny India a seat on the UN Security Council are just some of the factors which suggest that moving beyond the bloc’s economic goals to develop a political agenda will not be a straightforward process.
Membership in the BRICS bloc may have repercussions for South Africa’s level of engagement in the IBSA Dialogue Forum, set up in 2003 by India, Brazil and South Africa to establish a broad agenda of cooperation, including a goal to democratise global decision-making bodies such as the UN and the World Bank in order to adjust the balance of power between rich and poor countries.
LOOKING AHEAD: At the end of 2011, the government announced plans to invest R1.6bn ($195.8m) in two new business jets to be used by government officials travelling abroad. Intended to replace the Inkwazi, a Boeing business jet that once shuttled President Mbeki around the world’s capitals, defence officials have countered criticism of their cost by pointing out that they will allow for longer, intercontinental presidential missions – visits that are likely to become more frequent in the coming years.
The complexities of South Africa’s international relations defy a simplified, prescriptive approach. Nevertheless, following a year in which the country’s foreign policy decisions have attracted considerable international attention, the government’s efforts to align its external relations – and particularly those with fellow AU member states – with its national interests and needs will be a matter of great interest to domestic and international onlookers alike.
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